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ARGUMENT 
Introduction. 
Appellants Richard and Nancy Madsen's Reply Brief 
includes 14 case opinions which were not cited in their opening 
brief and which have not been addressed by Prudential Federal 
Savings & Loan Association. Most of those opinions are clearly 
distinguishable without comment. Six of them merit brief 
discussion, however. 
1. Cases Cited in "Madsens' Point I." 
The Madsens (their reply brief at 1-3, Point I) urge 
the Court to ignore Judge Fishier1s findings and conclusion and 
to re-examine the issue of disqualification anew. Federal 
courts, they contend, do so and they cite three cases in 
support: United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231 (3rd Cir. 1982); 
United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985); United 
Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. 
App. 3d 97, 216 Cal. Rptr. 4 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1985). Not one 
of the cases supports the Madsens' argument. 
In United States v. Nobel, the government charged the 
defendants had devised a scheme to defraud Insurance Company of 
North America. The district court judge told defense counsel 
that he and his family owned stock in INA (worth approximately 
$10/000 to $15,000). He mentioned it again on the eve of 
trial. Defense counsel did not object. After guilty verdicts 
were returned, one defendant appealed, contending the judge 
should have recused himself either under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) 
because "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned," or 
under § 455(b) because he had "a financial interest in the 
subject matter in controversy." In addressing the issue, the 
court noted at the outset: 
The accepted standard for reviewing disqualification 
decisions is to determine whether there has been an 
abuse of discretion. 
Id. at 234. The court's review was plenary only on the legal 
interpretation of § 455(b): 
However, whether a financial interest in a corporation 
which was the victim of the crime at issue is a 
"financial interest in the subject matter in 
controversy" [within the meaning of § 455(b)] is a 
matter of law as to which our review is plenary. 
Id. at 234. The Court did not hold its entire review was 
plenary. 
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United States v. Murphy is another criminal case. The 
defendant appealed his conviction, contending the close 
personal relationship between the judge and the prosecutor 
placed the judge's impartiality in question under § 455(a). 
The Court held the inquiry into the appearance of partiality is 
objective, without questions about actual bias. The case says 
nothing whatsoever about the standard for review on appeal. 
United Farm Works v. Superior Court yields two 
important guidelines, neither of which were mentioned by the 
Madsens. First, under the disqualification procedure employed 
by Rule 63(b) (in which the challenged judge must allow another 
judge to determine the issue of disqualification), the 
appellate court is bound by the findings of fact made below. 
Id. at 11. Second, the economic aspects of the case (the costs 
to retry the case and the overall inconvenience to the parties 
and to the court) are given no weight: 
While the waste of . . . trial weeks would be 
unfortunate, the parties* right to a fair trial cannot 
be compromised by such considerations. 
Id. at 11, note 7. 
2. Cases Cited in "Madsens' Point II." 
Prudential contends (its brief at 48-49, note 20) 
disqualification relates back and renders all discretionary 
judicial acts taken by the trial judge void. The Madsens admit 
(their reply brief at 3-5, Point II) disqualification is 
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retroactive, but claim retroactivity applies only in cases of 
actual bias and not when the trial judge merely gives the 
appearance of partiality. The cases cited by the Madsens 
actually disprove their own argument. 
The case most favorable to the Madsens is United 
States v. Murphv, supra. There, the court held 
disqualification works prospectively for one reason: 
Our research has not turned UP any case involving mere 
appearance of impropriety in which the court set aside 
[prior] decisions . . . . 
Id. at 1539. The court then footnoted its statement, noting 
that a decision from the Fifth Circuit (Hall v. SBA, 695 F.2d 
175 (5th Cir. 1983)) appeared to come close but the case was 
best understood, said the court, as an example of actual bias, 
not mere appearance, id. at 1539, note 3. The Madsens1 second 
citation, Health Services Acquisition Corp v. Lilieberq, 796 
F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1986), resolves the matter. In that case 
the court held a party may move to vacate a prior judgment 
solely on an appearance of partiality. In support, the court 
cited its prior decision of Hall, which it said was a case of 
the appearance of partiality. Id. at 802. 
In the closing paragraph of Point II, the Madsens 
contend the successor to Judge Rigtrup has the power to sign 
and enter findings of fact. The opinion of State v. Kelsey, 
532 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1975) is cited as support. The case has no 
application here. In Kelsey, the original judge tried the 
defendant; he stated his verdict and judgment on the record; he 
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prepared a final judgment, the sentence, and an order of 
commitment; but then he resigned before written findings of 
fact and conclusions of law were made. His successor later 
signed findings and conclusions, and this Court ruled he was 
authorized by Rule 63(a) to sign them. That is not this case. 
None of the final paperwork had been prepared, signed, or 
entered by Judge Rigtrup before Prudential moved for 
disqualification. Moreover, Judge Rigtrup is not disabled 
within the meaning of Rule 63(a). The telling distinction 
between the cases, however, is this: The findings and 
conclusions were not required in Kelsey; they were surplusage. 
Id. at 1005. That is not true here. Making and entering 
findings, conclusions, and a judgment are mandatory in a civil 
case. See Rules 52(a) and 58(A), U.R.Civ.Pro. 
3. Cases Cited in "Madsens' Point III." 
The Madsens contend a judge need not be disqualified 
if his financial interest in the outcome of the case is small. 
They cite Union Carbide Corp. v. U.S. Cutting Service, Inc., 
782 F.2d 710 (7th Cir. 1986) for support. Its facts have no 
application to this case. There, the judge had presided over a 
complicated plaintiff class action for two and one-half years. 
Then, in February, 1983, the judge married. Her new husband 
maintained a personal retirement account which happened to 
contain $100,000 worth of stock in IBM and Kodak. In May, 1984 
and again in May, 1985, the judge disclosed her husband's stock 
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interests in her annual financial disclosure statements 
required by federal law. In July, 1985, the defendant moved 
the judge to recuse herself, pointing out that IBM and Kodak 
were potential members of the alleged plaintiff class, although 
then unnamed and a fact previously unknown to the judge. In 
fact, there was at the time no list of class members. The 
judge immediately ceased ruling on any motions in the case, 
referring them to a magistrate or to another judge instead. 
She instructed the parties to brief the issue whether § 455(b) 
would be violated if her husband immediately sold the IBM and 
Kodak stock in his retirement account. In the meantime, she 
also asked the Advisory Committee on Codes of Conduct of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States for an advisory 
opinion. The Committee concluded that a sale of the stock 
would remove her disqualification under Canon 3C(l)(c) of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct. The judge ultimately determined she 
could resume control of the case if her husband sold the 
stock. He did so, incurring a brokerage fee of $900. The 
defendant contended on appeal the sale did not cure the 
disqualification. 
The Court of Appeals held the $900 brokerage fee was 
too small to warrant a reasonable person's belief that the 
judge was harboring any ill will towards the defendant. It 
based that conclusion on several factors: her significant 
salary; that her husband was a partner in one of the largest 
law firms in Chicago; and that the $900 was less than 1% of the 
proceeds of the sale. The most important factor, however, was 
that the fee would have been incurred anyway, whenever the 
husband decided to sell the stock in his retirement account. 
Thus, the $900 fee was inevitable. Id. at 716. Here, Judge 
Rigtrup stands to gain money/ and his interest is the same as 
every member of the plaintiff class. 
4. Cases cited in "Madsens' Point VII(D)." 
Prudential noted (its brief at 42, note 24) the trend 
in federal courts is to find disqualification cannot be 
waived. The Madsens (their reply brief at 15-16, Point VII 
(D)) disagree, quoting United States v. Nobel, supra. The 
Madsens have not read Nobel carefully. 
The disagreement between the parties is due to 
semantics. Prudential's argument is that the issue of 
disqualification cannot be "waived" (i.e., relinquished, lost, 
etc.) merely by not asserting it sooner rather than later. The 
authorities cited by Prudential illustrate the rule (its brief 
at 42, note 24). The Court in Nobel repeatedly uses the term 
"waiver" when actually it means "remittal" of 
disqualifiaction. "Remittal" is the intentional abandonment of 
a party's claim of disqualification after full disclosure by 
the judge on the record of the potentially disqualifying 
factors. Section 455(e) provides for remittal of the 
appearance of partiality under § 455(a). That is why Nobel 
focuses on the judge's repeated disclosure of his stock 
interest in INA: 
[I]t is sufficient under the statute if the judge 
provides full disclosure of his or her relationship at 
, a time early enough to form the basis of a timely 
motion at or before trial and under circumstances 
which avoid any subtle coercion. The election to 
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proceed after full disclosure of the relevant facts 
satisfies those requisites and constitutes an 
effective waiver [remittal] under the statute. 
Id, at 237. Footnote omitted. The court then specifically 
referred to Canon 3D of the Code of Judicial Conduct (titled 
"Remittal of Disqualification") and noted that § 455(e), unlike 
the Canon, does not describe a formal procedure for 
accomplishing remittal. The court concluded that the 
advantages from following the Canon's detailed remittal 
procedure are obvious. Id. at 237. 
CONCLUSION 
The cases cited by the Madsens in their Reply Brief 
are not persuasive. The Order of Disqualification entered by 
Judge Fishier should be affirmed. 
DATED this 10th day of April, 1987. 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
\4*^p/- i*£* By ^y^O fpaM^ / ^Uc^vK. 
Joseph dJ. Palmer 
Attorneys for Respondent 
*w Prudential Federal Savings & 
Loan Association 
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